It has been suggested by Siegler (1982) that 'The principle of medical confidentiality described in medical codes of ethics... has become old, worn-out and useless; it is a decrepit concept'. Is he right?
In the Louvre in Paris one may find a stone pillar on which is inscribed the code of Hammurabi, King of Babylon in the 18th century BC. This code, which sought to integrate Sumerian and Semitic traditions, included the first clear rules on medical practice. Surgeons were both rewarded and punished by results, depending upon the social status of the patient; e.g. 'If the doctor, in opening an abscess, shall kill the patient, his hands shall be cut off'. If, however, the patient was a slave, the doctor was obliged simply to replace his victim. Confidentiality did not feature. Indeed, the Greek historian Herodotus in his 'History' states that it was the custom in Babylon to lay the sick in the street so that anyone passing by might offer advice. Alternative medicine? Certainly no concern with medical records.
Happily, Hammurabi was subsequently superseded by Hippocrates who was content to rely upon an appeal for correct conduct, without threat of punishment. Hippocrates' codefor such it waswas substantially endorsed in 1948 by the Declaration of Geneva, which was most recently amended in 1983 (World Medical Association 1983) . It is noteworthy how relevant this code remains today. What principles did it advocate? (I) To show life-long respect to one's teachers (a very proper priority).
(2) To put the good of the patient first.
(3) To avoid doing harm (no iatrogenic disease here). (4) To lead a blameless life: 'with purity and with holiness I will pass my life and practise my Art' (a counsel of perfection which nevertheless recognizes the indivisibility of personal conduct and professional responsibility). (5) To recognize one's professional limitations (and, conversely, what might reasonably be expected of one in the prevailing circumstances). (6) To respect the trust of the patient at all times. (7) To preserve confidentiality: 'whatsoever things I see or hear concerning the life of man, in my attendance on the sick or even apart therefrom, which ought not to be noised abroad, I will keep silence thereon'.
Confidentiality and privacy It is common practice to discuss confidentiality in isolation from other considerations of privacy, which is unfortunate because 'the good of the patient' encompasses so much more than the maintenance of secrecy. Our concern must be with nothing less than the human rights and dignity of the patient. fhe importance of bearing this wider context of confidentiality constantly in mind has been spelled out in an important paper by Francis (1982) . So far from confidentiality within the wider context of privacy being 'a decrepit concept', it has probably never been better protected, at least in theory and in Europe, than it is today through the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 8 of the Convention 'Paper read to Library (Scientific Research) Section, 26 January 1984. Accepted 1 March 1984 gives individual citizens of member States the right of petition to the European Commission and Court of Human Rights if they are aggrieved by any action, within the ambit of their government, for which they have been unable to obtain redress within their own country (Brownlie 1950) . The recent revision of mental health legislation in the UK owed much of its inspiration to the European Convention, which is effectively a system of developing case law, and it remains to be seen what limits will eventually be set.
In 1982 the Council of Ministers of the Council of Europe, preferring the advice of its Committee on Legal Cooperation to alternative proposals from its Health Committee, set up a working party to define some legal duties of doctors towards their patients. It was argued that better legal definition of the respective rights and duties of the interested persons should contribute to a better relationship between doctors and patients. This exercise, which is nearing completion, has caused serious misgivings in various quarters and, although the status of the final document remains to be resolved, it behoves those responsible for professional codes of ethics to be familiar with the duties and penalties which may be imposed under the Convention.
Whatever differences may be postulated between their respective interests, doctors and patients will surely join forces in sharing the concern Francis (1982) expressed in his paper about intrusions into the privacy of patients. He criticized papers in which officers of the then Bolton Area Health Authority sought to justify disturbing incidents in the BBC television documentary entitled Hospital, which were based upon patients in the care of their Authority. But does the public really care? More recently, I was surprised by the absence of any public reaction to a particularly deplorable breach of etiquette, if not of ethics. On the evening that the news broke that the pressure group 'Life' had accused a gynaecologist of attempted murder following an operation for termination of pregnancy on the daughter of a medical colleague, someone who appeared to be speaking for the Luton and Dunstable Health Authority appeared on Independent Television News to volunteer clinical information about the mother and child. Immediately, a television camera zoomed in on the professional plate which clearly showedand was intended to revealthe name of the young mother's general practitioner father, thereby identifying her. When the unholy alliance of an irresponsible broadcaster and an acquiescent bureaucracy panders to the 'Peeping Toms', not only are vulnerable individuals placed grievously at risk, but dreadful damage is done to the delicate fabric of public decency. I am not suggesting that such lapses are commonplace, only that they should be conspicuous by their absence. On a happier note, my experience in a professional hot seat reassures me that the large majority of medical journalists and reporters in the UK practise a standard of professional ethics of which they can be proud and for which we can be grateful.
Breaches of responsibility for the preservation of confidentiality 'Whatsoever... ought not to be noised abroad, I will keep silence thereon'. This precept tends in practice to be defined in the breach. The medical profession in the UK accepts the following exceptions which prove the rule (British Medical Association 1981a):
(1) when the patient gives full, free and informed consent to disclosure;
(2) when the doctor judges that it is undesirable on medical grounds to seek the patient's consent but the patient's interest dictates that information should be passed on;
(3) when there is a clear overriding duty to society; (4) when information is required for purposes of medical research and it is impractical or undesirable to seek explicit consent; (5) when information is required by law (although the doctor is free to invite contempt of court and take the consequences).
In any case in which the strict code of confidentiality is deliberately breached for whatever reason, the doctor must apply the acid test: 'Can I satisfy my own conscience?' If he cannot, he is unlikely to succeed in justifying himself to his peers, as he must be prepared to be called upon to do.
In practice, deliberate breaches of confidentiality which can be justified in good faith and for good reason seldom cause concern. It is breaches, or leaks of information due to carelessness or indiscretion or even, sadly, to malevolence or personal advantage, which present the greatest risk to all concerned. The late Henry Miller, when he was Dean of the Faculty of Medicine in Newcastle, once observed that as many as 150 different people had access to inpatient notes in hospital. 'It is a tribute to the discretion of all who work with doctors, including cleaners and porters, that breaches of confidentiality are so uncommon with manual records which tend to lie scattered around whilst the work is going on' (Macara 1984) . This is true of general practice as much as of hospital practice. The adoption of the professional ethic by other members of health care teams has been described as extended confidentiality.
Anxiety is frequently expressed about situations in which the relationship between the doctor and the patient differs from the traditional therapeutic model. One example is where the doctor is engaged by an insurance company to report upon an individual who may or may not be 'his' patient. Another variant is where the doctor is engaged by an employer to provide an occupational health service. In such cases the doctor ceases to be the patient's advocate. Not only is there no implied contract or compact: the doctor's opinion or advice might well conflict with the perceived interests of the individual. Yet again, problems rarely arise when trouble is taken to ensure that the 'patient' is clear about the situation and consequently that he is able to give valid consent to the transaction.
I cannot resist referring under this heading to the irony of the current controversy over contraception for minors, i.e. young people under the age of 16 years, because the profession is being pilloried for its insistence upon seeking ultimately to preserve confidentiality in a supremely sensitive clinical situation. What is the doctor to do when asked for contraception by a young girl who insists upon exposing herself to the risk of an unwanted and potentially disastrous pregnancy? The doctor will make every effort to ensure that the patient is capable of understanding fully the hazards and implications of what she is doing, not least because he will be anxious to determine whether contraception is in her best interests. Concern for family stability and parental responsibility must condition the doctor to do his utmost to try to persuade the girl to involve her parents or guardians from the earliest possible stage of consultation. But what if she adamantly refuses to do so? The General Medical Council (1983a) has ruled, in accordance with the traditional rules, that confidentiality should be preserved, and the Department of Health (1980) has issued guidance along similar lines. Predictably, the GMC's ruling, which is consistent with the British Medical Association's advice (1981b), has proved controversial, and the Departmental guidance has been the occasion of a Court action which failed to secure its withdrawal. An appeal is now pending. Critics do not appear to have thought the matter through. What are the alternatives? Is the GMC to advise doctors that, where the relationship between patients and parents or guardians has broken down (if any ever existed), they should as a general rule breach confidentiality? This is what some self-appointed guardians of public and personal morality seem to advocate. Moreover, if it were known that doctors would routinely disclose information to parents without consent, the young people most in need of help would fear, and therefore fail, to seek it, with predictable consequences. Incidentally, I am bemused by those who rush into print in the 'quality press' to argue that, becauseso they claimincreasing use of contraception has been accompanied by an increase in unwanted pregnancies and abortions, there must be a cause and effect relationship. It is not my purpose here to contest their dubious contention, but one is bound to ask, do they live in the real world? Has it not occurred to them that earlier maturity and the relaxation of traditional mores have combined to increase earlier sexual experience to such an extent that casualties would predictably be more frequent without contraception? The real logic of their argument is that pains should be taken to ensure that contraception is effective. The remaining alternative is for the GMC to advise doctors that they must exercise their own discretion in such cases, without guidance. For the GMC to assume the role of Pontius Pilate on such a vital issue would be an abdication of its statutory responsibility under the Medical Act 1978. Of course, there will always be exceptional cases in which breaches of confidence would be justified and the parents should be involved against the expressed wishes of the patient. It is inconceivable that a doctor who acted in good faith and for good reasons in such cases would be censured by his colleagues.
Confidentiality and communication
Information about health and disease is required for three purposesdiagnosis and treatment, research, and the evaluation and improvement of health services. The coin of professional responsibility has two sides; one is confidentiality, the other communication. Just as the interest of the patient normally dictates confidentiality, so does it imply the mobilization and development of the relevant services on his behalf.
Technological progress and specialization have revolutionized health care. Teamwork is the order of the day and the rapid and efficient transfer and utilization of information is a sine qua non of effective care. If the vital advantages of the initial one-to-one professional/patient relationship are to be preserved in a formula of (1+1)+n, where 'n' represents other members of the health care team, three safeguards are required:
(1) Whilst identifiable information may be freely communicated among doctors, or between doctors and other health professionals who are bound by a similar ethical code, great care and discretion must be used in deciding what information may properly be shared with members of the team who are not subject to such constraints. In all cases, 'it is the doctor's responsibility to ensure that such individuals appreciate that the information is being imparted in strict professional confidence' (GMC 1983b) .
(2) Identifiable information may be used only for the specific purpose of the continuing care of the patient, other than when appropriate authorization or consent has been given by the responsible clinician (who must be ready to justify his action) or the patient.
(3) Health professionals must continue to be in a position to control the 'contents and use' of information.
Confidentiality beyond the grave It is a basic tenet of confidentiality that 'the death of the patient does not absolve the doctor from the obligation to maintain secrecy' (GMC 1983c) . Controversy has arisen recently in the UK about the posthumous publication in medical journals of interesting clinical information about famous people, and the resulting dilemmas for medical journalists and historians have been expounded in challenging and scholarly papers by Lock (1984) and Loudon (1984) in the British Medical Journal. In what circumstances and to what extent may any doctor, whether or not in a direct relationship with the deceased, be absolved from the general duty of confidentiality to the dead patient? How far can or should each case be judged on its merits and in the light of legitimate professional and public interest? How important is consideration for surviving relatives, and how far should such consideration extend horizontally and vertically through the family tree? Does the intention to rehabilitate an individual's reputation post mortem justify disclosure? Might a time limit be appropriate and, if so, what should it be?'How much weight should be placed upon the motivation of the reporter or historian rather than upon the facts alone? The medical profession has a clear duty to respond to such questions, not only in order to protect responsible medical writers but, more importantly, to reassure apprehensive patients that there will be no relaxation of the absolute requirement of confidentiality even after death, other than for the most compelling and defensible reasons.
For practising doctors, the obligation of confidentiality to a deceased patient most often arises in relation to 'duration certificates'. The majority of insurance contracts are completed without any medical examination or report: applicants are required only to complete a health record form disclosing serious illnesses from which they know themselves to be suffering. When death occurs shortly after the policy takes effect, the insurance company may be anxious to establish whether their client has withheld vital information in order to defraud. The doctor may then be asked for a 'duration certificate', i.e. to specify the duration of any significant condition known to be relevant to the death. What should he do? Sadly for the insurance companies and their other clients who will suffer if fraud prevails, the doctor must remember that confidentiality extends beyond the grave. Next of kin, whether or not potential beneficiaries under the deceased's estate, have no power to release the doctor from his obligation. Exceptionally, the doctor may feel that he can accede to the request for information where he can show that it was virtually certain to have been his patient's wish that he should do so (Macara 1984) .
Control of contents and use of health information Sieghart (1984) clearly explains the disconcerting legal position concerning the ownership of health records in the National Health Service. Dare a legal layman like myself quibble about the precise legal position concerning the ownership of information contained in these records? Indeed, Kenny (1982) has averred that no Western legal system recognizes ownership of information as a separate legal concept distinct from ownership of the document containing it. Nevertheless, as I understand it, English law does not recognize any property rights in the human body and, whilst the matter has never been tested in the courts, it might be reasonable to speculate that, by extension, courts would refuse to adjudicate upon the ownership of information about that body. If they did adjudicate, it is difficult to see how a decision in favour of any one partypatient, professional, health authority, the statewould assist cooperation and mutual trust. Therefore we should focus our concern upon the practical issues involved in protecting the traditional professional responsibility for contents and use, which successive health ministers have indeed sought to reassure the health professions that they support through the means of Parliamentary statements and circulars to health authorities. Sieghart (1984) deals at length with the impact of computers in this field. As medical records become ever more complex and computerization revolutionizes the potential for readier access to information on a large scale, so it becomes more difficult for the individual doctor or other health professional to exercise his responsibility to protect confidentiality.
Ironically, it is legislation designed ostensibly to protect the confidentiality of computerized information which is currently causing most concern to all the health professions. The Data Protection Bill (1983), as currently drafted, would exempt from nondisclosure (i.e. allow disclosure without legal sanction) information required by the police, the tax authorities and the Inland Revenue. Neither patient nor doctor need ever know what information has been divulged, nor by whom.
It has been argued that the only fully satisfactory safeguard would be to exempt medical records from the exemption provisions of the Bill. This would have the effect of protecting the status quo ante and leaving decisions about disclosure to the discretion of the professional, subject to the accepted rights of access by the subject. The Home Office are clearly firmly opposed to such blanket exemption for one specified category of data user. The Interprofessional Working Group, which was set up upon the initiative of the BMA and the health departments under the chairmanship of Sir Douglas Black to advise the departments about the practical implications of the Bill for the confidentiality of health records, is urgently seeking adequate and acceptable safeguards to which legal force might be given. There is an encouraging unanimity of approach and opinion within the Group, and the exercise is giving grounds for hope, although it remains to be seen whether we shall succeed in securing legal safeguards within the data protection legislation for health information outside the NHS (e.g. in the insurance sector, in occupational health and in the whole field of local government). However, the health professions must take heart from their success in persuading the Home Office to withdraw proposals under concurrent legislation on Police and Criminal Evidence, which would have extended the power of courts to force doctors to disclose confidential personal information, to the potential disadvantage of their patients (British Medical Journal 1983) .
Concern about confidentiality of health information generated outside the NHS, or passing outside its control, has been sharpened by the Law Lords' ruling last year concerning an adoption case in Birmingham (House of Lords 1983). Whilst this ruling did no more than expound the existing situation, it forcibly drew to attention the disregarded fact that any local authority councillor may be able to establish a 'need to know' health information held by the Authority or any of its employees. In practice, such a 'need to know' is rarely likely to be conceded by the Council as a whole, and the Director of Social Services would normally screen the records before making them available. Nevertheless, a grave principle of confidentiality is involved. It cannot be disputed that it may be essential to the best interests of certain vulnerable patients, e.g. young children at risk of violence within the family, that vital information should be shared between doctors and social workers, but the greatest care must clearly be taken by the health professional in divulging sensitive information which might be recorded in written form in any local authority record. The Association of County Councils and the Association of Metropolitan Authorities have joined forces, following discussions with the BMA and representatives of social workers and their Directors, in preparing guidelines for the protection of confidentiality, which are strongly to be recommended. It remains to be seen whether these Associations will succeed in persuading their members to apply the guidelines and to employ effective sanctions against anyone who breaches them. There remains a strong feeling, however, that nothing will ultimately suffice short of safeguards which have the force of law. The wish was father to the thought that, by reason of differences in the legal obligations of health service authorities and their professional employees respectively compared with local authorities and their professional employees, such a 'need to know' could not be established in a similar way by health authority members. Unhappily, on closer examination including a fruitless search of NHS legislation, no evidence can be found to support such an assumption. Happily health authority members, who do not have an electoral gallery to impress, are less likely to seek to establish a 'need to know' confidential information.
Subject access
In its seminal editorial on confidentiality and accountability in February last year, the Lancet (1983) made the shrewd observation: 'Now that effective medical care depends on team-work and the storage and easy referral of lifetimes of cumulative data, much of it judgemental, it sometimes seems as though the only person who never sees the record is the patient'. The leader writer proceeded to examine the implications of the consumer/provider model of relationships between patients and professionals in health care, which leads logically to the adoption of antagonistic postures and breeds litigation. The Lancet believes that most people subscribe to this model. I am afraid it is probably right, because such a model is inimical to the whole ethos of a national health service in which adversarial attitudes should as a general rule be unnecessary. 'More than 30 years' experience of the NHS has shown that trust is increased and dependence reduced by such a purely human cash-free transaction'. The preferred alternative to the consumer/provider model must surely be one of partnership between the patient or potential patient, and the doctor or other health professional, which should be enhanced rather than jeopardized by the leading health professional's involvement in an extended team. Partnership implies the fullest possible sharing of information on a basis of mutual confidence. The moot word is 'possible'.
The Chairman of the Patients' Association, Dame Elizabeth Ackroyd, hit the headlines earlier this year with a letter of support to the 1984 Campaign for Freedom of Information when she wrote, 'The refusal of access to medical records and the anxiety set up by this refusal can be very distressing, indeed damaging to health' (Medical News 1984) . Dame Elizabeth continued: 'Why should not people see their medical records if they wish to? The Association has never received a convincing answer to this question'. She seems to imply that information on the record should be fully and freely available to the subject, whatever its nature. The Interprofessional Working Group (1983) , in its considered advice to the health departments, takes a different view: 'The unregulated release of the entire clinical or social record could cause distress, or even harm, to a patient or client or to someone else'. Nevertheless, the Group began its statement with the words, 'We support the right of patients and clients to have access to all information which is held about them on their behalf, believing that 'such access encourages openness and can improve the quality of the record by correcting factual errors and reducing misunderstandings'. The difference between the Patients' Association and the health professionals centres upon a judgment about the importance of the view, and again I quote the IPWG, that 'in some cases the personal record may also include information on others, who are entitled to have their confidence kept. Also, many records would be unintelligible to a layman without professional interpretation and explanation'. The Lancet leader writer referred to above rehearsed many answers to Dame Elizabeth's question, which certainly convince the health professionals: for example, '. . . effective care still requires tentative judgements which must sometimes either be wrong, or in the course of time become wrong ... It is the job of a good doctor to fear the worst and to shoulder some of this fear on behalf of the patient. It is also our job to see that such suspicions do not become indelible labels on patients ... Doctors' records are written to themselves and to one another, not to patients' (Lancet 1983) . The Lancet joins the IPWG in stating that these reservations, which derive from hard professional experience, do not mean that records cannot be made far more accessible to patients than they now are, and the IPWG in its statement suggested mechanisms for the exercise of 'a proper discretion by the responsible clinician or other health professional [which] should provide for subject access to the extent and in the manner judged most helpful'.
However much Dame Elizabeth and her Association may decry this professional concern as patronizing, it is based upon the concern that 'the imposition of an absolute requirement to afford unrestricted access could inhibit health professionals from recording sensitive information or opinions, to the inevitable detriment of patient care' (Interprofessional Working Group 1983) .
Social responsibility of the health professional
There is no direct or explicit reference in Hippocrates' code to the doctor's responsibility to the community as a whole, and although the Declaration of Geneva starts with a solemn pledge of consecration to the service of humanity, 'for centuries codes of medical ethics have concentrated on proper behaviour toward individual patients and almost ignored the doctor's responsibilities to society' (Roemer 1982) . Given proper protection for identifiable personal health information, there need be no conflict between the doctor's responsibility to the community as a whole and the preservation of confidentiality and privacy. Indeed, it can be argued that doctors and other health professionals have a special responsibility and opportunity to educate the public about the protection and promotion of health, the prevention of disease and the use of the resources which are available to support their own efforts. Within their administrative limits, the annual reports of medical officers of health met all these desirable objectives. Instead of bewailing their demise in the 1974 reorganization of the NHS, could not district health authorities all emulate the example of a selective band of district medical officers who have resurrected such a report which can be potentially more comprehensive than in the past? Complementary opportunities on 'a more intimate level' lie to the hand of general practitioners who 'could report regularly to their patients and discuss local health issues with them' (Lancet 1983).
